A critical vulnerability lurking in the core UEFI firmware used across modern servers and enterprise hardware allows attackers to execute unauthorized code early in the boot sequence, effectively evading foundational security mechanisms. The flaw carries a severity score of 9.5 out of 10 and affects TianoCore EDK II, the foundational open-source codebase licensed by major BIOS vendors including AMI, Phoenix, and Insyde, as well as Microsoft’s Project Mu fork.
Tracked as CVE-2026-97631, the issue involves a 16-year-old memory corruption vulnerability residing in the PXE-Base Code driver responsible for network boots. When devices initialize over a local network, the driver monitors for incoming ICMP error messages but fails to restrict incoming data to its allocated 504-byte buffer. An attacker with access to the local network can transmit an oversized packet to trigger a buffer overflow, allowing arbitrary code to run in ring 0 before the operating system, Secure Boot, or the Trusted Platform Module can establish a verified chain of trust.
The flaw came to light prematurely after hardware supplier AMI submitted a public pull request containing the fix on GitHub, disrupting a coordinated disclosure timeline originally organized by researchers Alex Matrosov of Anthropic and Dan Holmes of Google for January. Following the public commit, TianoCore maintainers released a formal advisory detailing the problem.
Security analysts note that while the bug enables deep system compromise—potentially allowing adversaries to undermine full-disk encryption via early access to the TPM—exploitation is not universally automated. Crafting working exploits requires tuning payloads to specific memory layouts of the targeted hardware. Furthermore, the vector is restricted to machines configured to boot over the network, leaving standard disk-booted consumer endpoints unaffected. Mitigating the issue will require system administrators to roll out firmware updates across affected hardware or temporarily disable PXE boot functionality where feasible.
Source: arstechnica.com



